Weakness of Will
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8125109 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarah Bu (corresponding author), Sarah Buss |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 13-44 |
| Publication date | 1997-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0114.00026 |
| OpenAlex | W2049776266 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
My chief aim is to explain how someone can act freely against her own best judgment. But I also have a second aim: to defend a conception of practical rationality according to which someone cannot do something freely if she believes it would be better to do something else. These aims may appear incompatible. But I argue that practical reason has the capacity to undermine itself in such a way that it produces reasons for behaving irrationally. Weakness of will is possible because it is possible to conclude that one has sufficient reason to reject the verdicts of one's own reason
Epistemology · Law and economics · Rationality · Sociology · Weakness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Philosophy
What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion
Akratic Action under the Guise of the Good
Deflating and Debunking
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
Weakness of will, reasonability, and compulsion
An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will
Philosophical Questions about the Nature of Willpower
| Citations per year | 0.32 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2004 - 2026 (23) |
| Highly cited | No |