The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8126185 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sofie Møller (0000-0002-0755-5805, corresponding author), Sofie C Møller |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2013-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kant-Studien (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-8877 • E-ISSN: 1613-1134 |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/kant-2013-0021 |
| OpenAlex | W2089751522 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
The aim of the present paper is to discuss how the legal metaphors in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can help us understand the work’s transcendental argumentation. I discuss Dieter Henrich’s claim that legal deductions form a methodological paradigm for all three Critiques that exempts the deductions from following a stringent logical structure. I also consider Rüdiger Bubner’s proposal that the legal metaphors show that the transcendental deduction is a rhetorical argument. On the basis of my own reading of the many different uses of legal analogies in the first Critique , I argue that they cannot form a consistent methodological paradigm as Henrich and Bubner claim
Argument (complex analysis · Argumentation theory · Epistemology · Linguistics · Reading (process · Rhetorical question · Transcendental number · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.3 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |