Seeking mechanisms underlying accountability in crises

A qualitative comparative analysis of 29 cases in China

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8132085
AutoresYanwei Li (0000-0002-6928-2478, Shandong University), Hanwen Cheng (Dalian University of Technology), Hao Li (0000-0001-5192-5458, Nanjing University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2026
Fecha de publicación2026-01-23
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPublic Policy and Administration (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0952-0767 • E-ISSN: 1749-4192
EditorialSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/09520767251414832
OpenAlexW7125647492
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas47

Following crises, accountability invariably follows. Notably, the extant literature has largely overlooked the manner in which local governments enact crisis accountability during such events. Utilizing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), this study investigates 29 safety crises across China. Drawing on principles from principal-agent theory and governance network theory, we examine how combinations of four conditions—namely hierarchical pressure, social pressure, crisis severity, and network complexity—result in varying levels of crisis accountability by local governments. The research identifies three principal mechanisms that elucidate high levels of crisis accountability: the reputation maintenance mechanism, the pressure-based mechanism, and the blame avoidance mechanism. Furthermore, the findings indicate that hierarchical pressure from the central government is the predominant factor influencing high crisis accountability. This study advances the governance and policy literature by elucidating the mechanisms underlying crisis accountability at the local government level

Accountability · Blame · China · Comparative research · Corporate governance · Extant taxon · Government (linguistics · Qualitative comparative analysis · Reputation · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Policy Transfer and Learning · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research