Are the Things That We Call ‘Wrong’ Contrary to the Commands of a Loving God
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8203250 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Wesley Robbins (Robotics Research (United States), corresponding author) |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-98 |
| Publication date | 1981-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the American Academy of Religion (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0002-7189 • E-ISSN: 1477-4585 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jaarel/xlix.1.89 |
| OpenAlex | W1999672486 |
| Language | EN |
Divine command theories of morality have not been particularly popular among philosophers for some time. Consequently, such theories have received very little serious attention in recent years. One notable exception to this rule has been Robert M. Adams, who on several occasions has defended what he calls a modified divine command theory of ethical wrongness (1973, 1979a, 1979b). Most recently he has formulated this theory in terms drawn from current work on the theory of meaning. Specifically, he has proposed an account of the meaning of the term similar to Hilary Putnam's account of the meaning of natural kind terms such as water and gold. In this paper I will (1) describe the major features of Putnam's account of the meaning of natural kind terms, (2) describe Adams's analogous account of the meaning of the term wrong, (3) discuss what I take to be some advantages of Adams's theory, (4) discuss two problems with it, and (5) propose an alternative which retains the advantages and avoids the problems discussed here. According to Adams it is a necessary truth (if it is true at all) that any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. But, and this is where the new theory of meaning comes into play, this is not an analytic proposition. It is not the result of an analysis of a concept or of moral language. Nor is it a proposition that is known a priori. It does not represent what everyone thinks that wrong actions are. Nor does it represent how everyone recognizes wrong actions for what they are. Nor does it represent just the meaning of the concepts, or language, of Judaeo-Christian believers. Rather, it represents the actual nature of wrong actions. As such, the proposition is necessarily true (if it is true at all), although it is a synthetic one and epistemically a posteriori.
Theology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |