Pular para o conteúdo principal

ETHNOS_APP

Início • Busca • Periódicos • Lista 0

Capital Markets and Financial Politics

Preferences and Institutions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8246723
AutoresMark J Roe (autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume7
Fascículo1
Data de publicação2012-01-19
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCapitalism and Society (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1932-0213 • E-ISSN: 2194-6140
EditoraWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/1932-0213.1094
OpenAlexW2105445039
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas42

For capital markets to function, political institutions must support capitalism in general and the capitalism of financial markets in particular. Yet capital markets’ shape, support, and extent are often contested in the polity. Powerful elements — from politicians to mass popular movements — have reason to change, co-opt, and remove value from capital markets. And players in capital markets have reason to seek rules that favor their own capital channels over those of others. How these contests are settled deeply affects the form, the extent, and the effectiveness of capital markets. And investigation of the primary political economy forces shaping capital markets can point us to a more general aspect of economic, political, and legal institutions. Much important work has been done in recent decades on the vitality of institutions. Less well emphasized thus far is that widely-shared, deeply-held preferences, often arising from current interests and opinions, can at times sweep away prior institutions or, less dramatically but more often, sharply alter or replace them. When they do so, old institutions can be replaced by new ones, or strongly modified. Preferences can at crucial times trump institutions, and how the two interact is well-illustrated by the political economy of capital markets

Capital (architecture · Capital market · Capitalism · Economic capital · Economic system · Economics · Financial capital · Financial market · Human capital · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Polity · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Corruption and Economic Development · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law · Finance

  • Political Order in Changing Societies

    Samuel P Huntington•Political Order in Changing…•1969

  • Polyarchy

    Robert Alan Dahl•Polyarchy•1973

  • Modern Corporation and Private Property

    Adolf A Berle•Modern Corporation and Private…•2017

  • The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective

    Open Access•Robert C Allen•British Industrial Revolution in…•2009

  • The great reversals

    Open Access•Raghuram G Rajan, Luigi Zingales•Journal of Financial Economics•2003

  • The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

    Marco Pagano, Paolo F Volpin•American Economic Review•2005

  • Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights

    Open Access•Konstantin Sonin•Journal of Comparative Economics•2003

  • The Regulation of Labor

    Juan Carlos Botero, Simeon Djankov et al.•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2004

  • The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•American Economic Review•2001

  • Africa's Growth Tragedy

    William Easterly, Robert Levine•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1997

  • Theory of the firm

    Open Access•Michael C Jensen, William H Meckling•Journal of Financial Economics•1976

  • Fractionalization

    Open Access•Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer et al.•Journal of Economic Growth•2003

  • Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

    Open Access•Douglass C North•Institutions, Institutional…•1990

  • Quiet Politics and Business Power

    Open Access•P D Culpepper•Quiet Politics and Business Power•2010

  • Why is there no Socialism in the United States

    Werner Sombart, C T Husbands et al.•Why Is There No Socialism in the…•2019

  • Income distribution, political instability, and investment

    Open Access•Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti•European Economic Review•1996

  • Democracy and Redistribution

    Carles Boix•Choice Reviews Online•2005

  • The politics of stock market development

    Paulo Moreira Pinto, Pablo M Pinto et al.•Review of International Political…•2010

  • Inequality does cause underdevelopment

    Open Access•William Easterly•Journal of Development Economics•2006

  • The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law

    Marcel Kahan, Ehud Kamar•Stanford Law Review•2002

  • Rents and Their Corporate Consequences

    Mark J Roe•Stanford Law Review•2001

  • Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control

    Mark J Roe•Stanford Law Review•2000

  • A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Mark J Roe•Stanford Law Review•1999

  • A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures

    Charles M Tiebout•Journal of Political Economy•1956

  • The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents

    Enrico Perotti, Enrico C Perotti et al.•Journal of Political Economy•2006

  • Constitutions and Commitment

    Open Access•Douglass C North, Barry R Weingast•The Journal of Economic History•1989

  • Exiting a Lawless State

    Open Access•Karla Hoff, Joseph E Stiglitz•The Economic Journal•2008

  • Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions

    Open Access•Trine Iversen, Torben Iversen et al.•American Political Science Review•2006

Velocidade de citaçãohistorical
Altamente citadoNão
Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae