Passive Corruption
How Institutions Corrupt People
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8253324 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Colin Bird (0000-0002-9328-8175, University of Virginia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 37-57 |
| Publication date | 2023-08-05 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2785-3330 • E-ISSN: 2785-4256 |
| Publisher | Firenze University Press (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.36253/rifp-2275 |
| OpenAlex | W4385632389 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 3 |
This paper questions the claim, advanced persuasively by Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti, that political corruption should primarily be understood as a “deficit of office accountability.” On the one hand, it identifies some ambiguities internal to their theory; these suggest that it underestimates the role of self-serving motives in corruption and overemphasizes the perversion of institutional mandates. On the other hand, it describes a form of “passive corruption” that their theory cannot easily accommodate. Passive corruption, I argue, consists in an excess, rather than a deficit, of “office accountability” and typically arises when different institutions come into conflict with each other
Accountability · Corrupt practices · Language change · Law and economics · Linguistics · Perversion · Political corruption · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |