Chinese Objectives in South Asia
Anti-Hegemony" vs. "Collective Security
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8371774 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Shirin Tahir-Kheli (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 996-1012 |
| Publication date | 1978-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Survey (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-4687 • E-ISSN: 1533-838X |
| Publisher | University of California Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2643566 |
| OpenAlex | W2050700397 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
THE YEAR 1971 was a watershed in Chinese relations with countries of South Asia. The quarrels between East and West Pakistan flared into a full-fledged secressionist movement, Pakistan acted as an intermediary between China and the United States, and India institutionalized its special relationship with the Soviet Union in the form of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship. Fears of direct Chinese involvement were laid to rest once the Indians attacked East Pakistan in December 1971, and the Chinese were unable to do much more than issue diplomatic diatribes. Any question of military involvement (or threat of involvement of the 1965 variety) became moot after Delhi's alliance with Moscow. The latter fact demonstrated the reality which has characterized Chinese policies in South Asia-namely, that the USSR is the focal point around which Chinese policy revolves. This paper will examine the specific ways in which Moscow affects Chinese policies in the subcontinent in the post-1971 period. In addition, it will identify the priorities and the problems which confront China's relations with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
China · Collective security · Economic system · Economics · Hegemony · International relations · Political science · Politics · Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography · Bangladesh Politics, Society, and Development · Law · South Asian Studies and Conflicts
| Citations per year | 0.02 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1981 - 1981 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |