South Vietnam
Political, Military and Constitutional Arenas in Nation Building
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8372012 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Charles A Joiner (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1968 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 58-71 |
| Publication date | 1968-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Survey (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-4687 • E-ISSN: 1533-838X |
| Publisher | University of California Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1525/as.1968.8.1.01p0335v |
| OpenAlex | W4237427371 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
During South Vietnam's 1967 presidential campaign numerous candidates including General Nguyen Van Thieu outlined steps for terminating hostilities. Potentiality for peace initiatives loomed above other political issues. However, at the end of 1967 neither side was prepared to consider peace negotiations seriously. Both proclaimed policies. The NLF and Hanoi asserted they would win. Thieu would talk on his terms only. The United States' position articulated by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, General William Westmoreland, and Deputy Ambassador Robert Komer was that the war was being won. Westmoreland spoke of four phases, a reverse adaptation of the MaoGiap phases. Phase I was the period to mid-1966, a stage of saving an unviable nation, construction, and build-up. The third phase would occur in 1968 and involve an ARVN take-over, a local forces build-up, and Delta pacification, while the final phase would be victory with the ARVN in full charge and the opposition infrastructure destroyed. This optimistic timetable assumed an American phase-out in two years. Westmoreland described Phase II, mid-1966 through 1967, as one of driving the enemy to sanctuaries (where PAVN regulars were increasingly centered), generally reducing the enemy's total potential, and building South Vietnam militarily and politically. American estimates were based upon a revised intelligence system.' It is difficult to assess to what extent official 1967 statistics were a function of improved tabulation processes as opposed to military and pacification gains. Even a sophisticated system of intelligence operates in probabilities rather than charted fact. Yet, two and one-half years after the large mid-1965 build-up, real though extremely expensive gains were to be noted in official claims: (1) There was an NLF loss of control of from 4.0 to 2.5 million people during the entire period, and a population increase under GVN control to 67% of South Vietnam's 17.1 million inhabitants-both estimates
Adversary · Computer security · Negotiation · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Sociology · Victory · Vietnam War · Computer Science · Historical Studies and Socio-cultural Analysis · Law · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 1969 - 2019 (51) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |