Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8395807
AutoresMichael Huemer (0000-0002-2346-3468, University of Colorado Boulder, autor correspondente)
Ano2009
Volume60
Fascículo2
Páginas345-375
Data de publicação2009-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axp008
OpenAlexW2136943651
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas29
Referências citadas18

A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to the latter problem, drawing on the notion of explanatory priority. The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction. 1. A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem of Induction 2. A Problem with Objective Bayesianism2.1. Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference 2.2. The inconsistency objection 2.3. An effort to contain the problem 3. Explanationist Relief for Objective Bayesianism3.1. Explanation and explanatory priority 3.2. Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors 3.3. In defense of Laplace 3.4. The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws 3.5. Inference to the best explanation? 4. Problems and objections4.1. Unknown explanatory possibilities 4.2. Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority 4.3. The probability of deterministic laws 4.4. Changing chances 4.5. Scruples concerning a priori probability

A priori and a posteriori · Bayesian probability · Causation · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Inference · Mathematical economics · Metaphysics · Probabilistic logic · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science