Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probabilities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396133 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yang Liu (0000-0003-1220-7044, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 795-810 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axaa009 |
| OpenAlex | W3008245145 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that for a given pair of events, one event may be considered ‘more probable’ than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, for example, lack of robust statistical information. I take it that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This article provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.
Bayesian probability · Econometrics · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Indeterminate · Mathematical economics · Preference · Statistics · Subjectivism · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
On Indeterminate Probabilities
A Definition of Subjective Probability
Utility Theory for Decision Making
The importance of incompleteness
Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
Incompleteness and Reasoned Choice
A simpler and more realistic subjective decision theory
Desirability foundations of robust rational decision making
Pragmatic Considerations on Comparative Probability
Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |