Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus and Psychological Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396179 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Klee (Ithaca College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 389-403 |
| Publication date | 1992-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/43.3.389 |
| OpenAlex | W1987451378 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, then there can be no purely physical laws either. This is illustrated with a case from immunology involving interferons. Since there clearly are physical laws, Davidson cannot be correct.
Argument (complex analysis) · Ceteris paribus · Economics · Epistemology · Holism · Indeterminacy (philosophy) · Monism · Positive economics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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