Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396206 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jon Williamson (0000-0003-0514-4209, King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 401-416 |
| Publication date | 1999-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/50.3.401 |
| OpenAlex | W2130723526 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 10 |
While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
Additive function · Argument (complex analysis) · Axiom · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Countable set · Discrete mathematics · Mathematical economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Facts of the Matter
Unsettled Thoughts
CHAPTER 7 Dutch Book Arguments
Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations
E.T. Jaynes’s Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity
Scotching Dutch Books
A scientific enquiry into the future
The influence of financial practice in developing mathematical probability
Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages
Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference
Fair Infinite Lotteries, Qualitative Probability, and Regularity
The Persecutor's Wager
Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas
Regularity and Hyperreal Credences
De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery
Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities
Bayesianism I
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,86 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2024 (21) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |