Contrastive Evidence and Inductive Risk
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396227 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jaakko Kuorikoski (0000-0001-5676-717X, University of Helsinki, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 61-76 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/715183 |
| OpenAlex | W3159647157 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
I argue that non-epistemic values are necessarily embedded in the measure of evidential strength of contrastive evidence. When evidence is contrastive, evidence is stronger the more it favours a hypothesis over a set of plausible, mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses. In such a contrastive epistemic setting, evidence has an effect not only on a particular hypothesis, but on the whole probability distribution over the set of alternative hypotheses. A natural way of analysing the incremental impact of new evidence on a set of alternative hypotheses is in terms of uncertainty or ‘entropy’ reduction. There is no unique single measure of uncertainty/entropy, however, and, consequently, no single unique measure of uncertainty reduction. Finally, I argue that the ‘right’ measure of entropy reduction, and hence of evidential strength, depends on the pragmatic context and non-epistemic values
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| Highly cited | No |
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