Cherniak on Scientific Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396282 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Harold I Brown (0000-0001-5533-9499, Northern Illinois University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 415-427 |
| Publication date | 1990-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/41.3.415 |
| OpenAlex | W2051323276 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
In the final chapter of Minimal Rationality Christopher Cherniak offers three arguments to show that an agent with finite cognitive resources is not capable of arriving at a true and complete theory of the universe. I discuss each of these arguments and show that Cherniak has not succeeded in making his antirealist case.
Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Physics · Rationality · Realism · Scientific realism · Scientific theory · Universe · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1994 - 1994 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |