Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation

Bibliographic Data

ID8396285
AuthorsFernando Cabrera (0000-0002-7327-610X, University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author), Frank Cabrera
Year2020
Volume71
Issue2
Pages727-750
Publication date2020-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axy010
OpenAlexW2744442157
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited42

In this article, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE), one that has received scant attention.1 The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of explanation. However, I argue that (i) how ranking explanations on this pluralistic account of IBE remains obscure and (ii) pluralism leads to contradictory results. In light of these objections, I attempt to dissolve the problem by showing why IBE does not require a ‘model’ of explanation and by giving an account of what explanation consists in within the context of IBE. 1. IBE and the Plentitude Problem 2. Three Potential Solutions 2.1. Solution 1: Primitivism 2.2. Solution 2: Accomodationism 2.3. Solution 3: Pluralism 3. Two Problems for Pluralism 3.1. Difficulties with ranking explanations 3.2. The inevitability of conflicting verdicts 4. Dissolving the Plentitude Problem 4.1. The explanatory virtues screen-off the model of explanation 4.2. The virtue-centric conception of explanation 5. Concluding Remarks

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