Finite Frequentism in a Big World
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396306 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nick Tosh (National University of Ireland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 169-213 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axu027 |
| OpenAlex | W1970607921 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
The view that chances are relative frequencies of occurrence within actual, finite reference classes has long been written off. I argue that it ought to be reconsidered. Focusing on non-deterministic chance, I defend a version of finite frequentism in which reference classmates are required to have qualitatively identical pasts. While my analysis can evade or resist several standard objections, it has a counterintuitive consequence: non-trivial chances entail the existence of past light cones that are perfect intrinsic duplicates. In mitigation, I argue that our scientific knowledge is consistent with the hypothesis that there are many such duplicates in the actual world. Moreover, my analysis has some striking advantages: it is simple, it is metaphysically undemanding, and it makes possible a satisfying explanation of the chance–credence connection. 1 Introduction 2 Target 3 Sketch and Skirmish 4 Articulation 5 Standard Worries 5.1 Frequency tolerance 5.2 Leibniz’s dictum 5.3 Single case chance 5.4 Missing values 5.5 Explanation 5.6 Counterfactual chances 6 Chance and Credence 6.1 An indefeasible indifference intuition 6.2 Articulating the credence principle 6.3 Appraising the credence principle 7 Confirmation 8 Laws 9 Summing Up
Counterfactual thinking · Counterintuitive · Credence · Epistemology · Intuition · Mathematical economics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Simple (philosophy) · Sketch · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
A Philosophical Guide to Chance
Laws and Symmetry
The Nature of Laws
Symposium: Chance and Credence
A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
Can we know the global structure of spacetime
On under-determination in cosmology
Laws of Nature
Reality and Humean Supervenience
Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self‐Locating Belief
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
Deterministic Chance
Principled Chances
Equipossibility Theories of Probability
Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle
The Big Bad Bug
On What We Know About Chance
Probability in the Everett Interpretation
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |