The Composition of Forces

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8396397
AutoresOlivier Massin (0000-0002-3949-4429, University of Geneva, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen68
Número3
Páginas805-846
Fecha de publicación2017-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axv048
OpenAlexW2296583123
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas40

This article defends a realist account of the composition of Newtonian forces, dubbed ‘residualism’. According to residualism, the resultant force acting on a body is identical to the component forces acting on it that do not prevent one another from bringing about the body's acceleration. Several reasons to favour residualism over alternative accounts of the composition of forces are advanced: (i) Residualism reconciles realism about component forces with realism about resultant forces, while avoiding any threat of causal over-determination. (ii) Residualism provides a systematic semantics for the term ‘force’ within Newtonian mechanics. (iii) Residualism allows us to precisely apportion the causal responsibility of each component force in the ensuing acceleration. (iv) Residualism handles special cases such as null forces, single forces, and antagonistic forces in a natural way. (v) Residualism provides a neat picture of the causal powers of forces. Each force essentially has two causal powers—the power to bring about accelerations (sometimes together with other co-directional forces) and the power to prevent other forces from doing so—exactly one of which is manifested at a time. (vi) Residualism avoids commitment to unobservable effects of forces, namely, forces cause either stresses (tensile or compressive) or accelerations. 1 Introduction2 Component Forces or Resultant Ones?2.1 Component forces versus resultant forces2.2 Two problems for generous realism3 Against Frugality (1): Semantic Unsystematicity3.1 The semantic problem for frugal resultant realism3.1.1 Do partial laws bear on resultant forces?3.1.2 Do partial laws bear on dispositions distinct from forces?3.2 The semantic problem for frugal component realism3.2.1 Does the second law bear on sets of component forces?3.2.2 Does the second law bear on individual component forces?4 Against Frugality (2): Causal Responsibility4.1 Apportioning causal responsibility4.2 Causal responsibility versus frugality5 Primivitism about Vectorial Composition5.1 Primitive vectorial composition5.2 First objection: causal responsibility5.3 Second objection: null forces6 Residualism6.1 Residualism introduced6.2 Residualism at work6.2.1 Antagonistic forces acting on a body6.2.2 Single force acting on a body6.2.3 Co-directional forces acting on a body6.2.4 Opposite forces acting on a body6.2.5 Two non-colinear forces acting on a body6.2.6 Three or more non-colinear forces acting on a body6.3 Residualism under stress6.3.1 Ad hoc?6.3.2 Circular?6.3.3 Inconsistent?6.3.4 Costly?7 Conclusion

Body force · Classical mechanics · Component (thermodynamics) · Conservative force · Fictitious force · Physics · Resultant force · Historical Philosophy and Science · History and Theory of Mathematics · Philosophy and History of Science