Understanding Induction

Bibliographic Data

ID8396456
AuthorsJohn Macnamara (0000-0003-1387-3882, McGill University, corresponding author)
Year1991
Volume42
Issue1
Pages21-48
Publication date1991-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/42.1.21
OpenAlexW4241282288
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited15

The paper offers a new understanding of induction in the empirical sciences, one which assimilates it to induction in geometry rather than to statistical inference. To make the point a system of notions, essential to logically sound induction, is defined. Notable among them are arbitrary object and particular property. A second aim of the paper is to bring to light a largely neglected set of assumptions shared by both induction and deduction in the empirical sciences. This is made possible by appealing to the logic of common nouns and applying it to the logic of natural-kind terms.This strategy yields a new insight into the concept of natural kinds. While the strategy reveals deep affinity between empirical induction and deduction it also reveals two problems peculiar to induction. This helps to explain the intuition that induction is the more problematic of the two. The paper does not set out ‘to solve the problem of induction’.

Epistemology · Grammar induction · Inference · Intuition · Mathematical economics · Mathematical induction · Object (grammar) · Property (philosophy) · Rule induction · Rule of inference · Artificial Intelligence · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Semantic Web and Ontologies

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