Relevance and the Ravens
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397169 |
|---|---|
| Authors | C A Hooker (The University of Sydney), David Stove (The University of Sydney) |
| Year | 1968 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 305-315 |
| Publication date | 1968-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/18.4.305 |
| OpenAlex | W2004960329 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
These are plausible statements of confirmation. But there is a general principle of confirmation, viz.: (3) Whatever confirms a given hypothesis also confirms any statement logically equivalent to it which is at least as plausible, but inconsistent with them. This fact constitutes the problem about the ravens. The most popular solution to this problem has been along the following. lines: that statement (i) is false; and that its plausibility is to be explained by the fact that, the world being as it actually is, evidence consisting of non-black non-ravens is more likely to be met with, and hence confirms 'All ravens are black' less, than the 'standard' evidence for it, viz. that which consists of black ravens.
Epistemology · Political science · Relevance (law) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy
History and Philosophy of Science in Australia
(C) Instances, the Relevance Criterion, and the Paradoxes of Confirmation
Selective confirmation and the Ravens
Hempel's Raven Paradox
That Confirmation may yet be a Probability
On ‘Ravens and Relevance’ and a Likelihood Solution of the Paradox of Confirmation
Confirmation, Paradoxes, and Possible Worlds
The Paradox of Confirmation1
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 1969 - 2006 (38) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |