What Perception Is Doing, and What it Is Not Doing, in Mathematical Reasoning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397306 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dennis Lomas (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 205-223 |
| Publication date | 2002-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/53.2.205 |
| OpenAlex | W2047390358 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
What is perception doing in mathematical reasoning? To address this question, I discuss the role of perception in geometric reasoning. Perception of the shape properties of concrete diagrams provides, I argue, a surrogate consciousness of the shape properties of the abstract geometric objects depicted in the diagrams. Some of what perception is not doing in mathematical reasoning is also discussed. I take issue with both Parsons and Maddy. Parsons claims that we perceive a certain type of abstract object. Maddy claims (at least at one time claimed) that perception provides the basis for intuition of mathematical sets. 1 Mathematical reasoning with diagrams 2 Do we perceive abstract objects? 3 Do we perceive mathematical sets?
Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Intuition · Object (grammar) · Perception · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization · History and Theory of Mathematics · Mathematics · Mathematics Education and Teaching Techniques · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |