Models, Mechanisms, and Coherence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397337 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matteo Colombo (0000-0002-2251-2248, Tilburg University, corresponding author), Stephan Hartmann (0000-0001-8676-2177, Munich School of Philosophy), Robert van Iersel (Tilburg University) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 181-212 |
| Publication date | 2015-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axt043 |
| OpenAlex | W2162628006 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 42 |
Life-science phenomena are often explained by specifying the mechanisms that bring them about. The new mechanistic philosophers have done much to substantiate this claim and to provide us with a better understanding of what mechanisms are and how they explain. Although there is disagreement among current mechanists on various issues, they share a common core position and a seeming commitment to some form of scientific realism. But is such a commitment necessary? Is it the best way to go about mechanistic explanation? In this article, we propose an alternative antirealist account that also fits explanatory practice in the life sciences. We pay special attention to mechanistic models, i.e. scientific models that involve a mechanism, and to the role of coherence considerations in building such models. To illustrate our points, we consider the mechanism for the action potential. 1 Introduction 2 Some Core Features of Mechanistic Explanation 3 Scientific Realism and Mechanistic Explanation 4 Antirealist Mechanistic Explanation: The Case of the Action Potential 5 Some Outstanding Issues for the Antirealist Mechanist 6 Two Problems for the Realist Mechanist 7 Conclusions
Action (physics) · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Core (optical fiber) · Epistemology · Mechanism (biology) · Philosophy of science · Physics · Realism · Scientific realism · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
The structure of empirical knowledge
Making Things Happen
Exceeding Our Grasp
Scientific Realism
Explaining the Brain
Causality
Neurophilosophy
Tracking Truth
Mechanisms and the nature of causation
Mechanisms and natural kinds
A quantitative description of membrane current and its application to conduction and excitation in nerve
Grasping At Realist Straws
Conceptual Revolutions
Explanation
Regularities and causality; generalizations and causal explanations
Causes and Explanations
When mechanistic models explain
Theory, intervention and realism
Data and phenomena
How scientific models can explain
Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation
Dynamic mechanistic explanation
Causes without Mechanisms
Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge
Mechanism and Biological Explanation
Thinking about Mechanisms
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
Saving the Phenomena
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
Response to Strevens
What was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement
| Citations per year | 0.8 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |