A Defense of Lucky Understanding

Bibliographic Data

ID8397702
AuthorsKevin Morris (0000-0002-8850-3985, Northern Arizona University, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume63
Issue2
Pages357-371
Publication date2012-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axr023
OpenAlexW2086318653
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited12

It is plausible to think that the epistemic benefit of having an explanation is understanding. My focus in this article is on the extent to which explanatory understanding, perhaps unlike knowledge, is compatible with certain forms of luck—the extent to which one can understand why something is the case when one is lucky to truly believe an explanatorily relevant proposition. I argue, contra Stephen Grimm ([2006]) and Duncan Pritchard ([2008], [2009]), that understanding quite generally is compatible with luckily believing a true, explanatorily relevant proposition. My strategy is to argue that various intuitions that seem to rule against lucky understanding can be explained away, and thus do not compel us to reject the thesis that, in general, understanding tolerates luck. In arriving at this conclusion, I address some salient issues regarding the testimony of others, and also draw out the consequences of my discussions for the status of understanding as a cognitive achievement. 1 Introduction 2 Lucky Understanding 3 Two Alleged Cases of Luck Undermining Understanding 4 Luck and the Transmission of Explanatory Understanding 5 Conclusion

Epistemology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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