Perception and Neuroscience
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397739 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Grant Gillett (Northeast Catholic College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 83-103 |
| Publication date | 1989-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/40.1.83 |
| OpenAlex | W1998170533 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 5 |
Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function in that form. This implies that the analysis of perception must consider not only the fact that there is an interaction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object but also that the interaction is shaped by a system of concepts which the subject uses in thought and action.
Action (physics) · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Competence (human resources) · Epistemology · Normative · Object (grammar) · Perception · Subject (documents) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Neuroscience · Neuroscience, Education and Cognitive Function · Philosophy · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.06 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 1993 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |