Parallel Architectures and Mental Computation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397757 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Wells (0000-0002-4935-7743, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 531-542 |
| Publication date | 1993-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/44.3.531 |
| OpenAlex | W2165547218 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
In a recent paper, Lyngzeidetson [1990] has claimed that a type of parallel computer called the ‘Connection Machine’ instantiates architectural principles which will ‘revolutionize which “functions” of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata.’ In particular, he claims that the Connection Machine architecture shows the anti-mechanist argument from Gödel's theorem to be false for at least one kind of parallel computer. In the first part of this paper, I argue that Lyngzeidetson's claims are not supported by his arguments; in the second part I consider some other aspects of parallel computation which may be of theoretical significance in cognitive science.
Argument (complex analysis) · Automaton · Cellular automaton · Cognition · Cognitive architecture · Cognitive science · Computation · Connection (principal bundle) · Programming language · Architecture · Artificial Intelligence · Cellular Automata and Applications · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · DNA and Biological Computing · Mathematics · Psychology · Theoretical Computer Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |