A Bayesian Paradox
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397889 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ruth Weintraub (0000-0001-9702-6263, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 51-66 |
| Publication date | 2001-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/52.1.51 |
| OpenAlex | W1967221373 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 11 |
A seemingly plausible application of Bayesian decision-theoretic reasoning to determine one's rational degrees of belief yields a paradoxical conclusion: one ought to jettison one's intermediate credences in favour of more extreme (opinionated) ones. I discuss various attempts to solve the paradox, those involving the acceptance of the paradoxical conclusion, and those which attempt to block its derivation.
Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Block (permutation group theory) · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2006 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |