Promiscuous Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8398159 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R A Wilson (0000-0002-8034-0317, Queen's University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 303-316 |
| Publication date | 1996-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/47.2.303 |
| OpenAlex | W4251501712 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 7 |
This paper is a critical discussion of John Dupré's recent defence of promiscuous realism in Part 1 of his The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. It also discusses some more general issues in the philosophy of biology and science. Dupré's chief strategy of argumentation appeals to debates within the philosophy of biology, all of which concern the nature of species. While the strategy is well motivated, I argue that Dupré's challenge to essentialist and unificationist views about natural kinds is not successful. One conclusion is that an integrative conception of species is a real alternative to Dupré's pluralism.
Argumentation theory · Epistemology · Essentialism · Metaphysics · Philosophy of science · Pluralism (philosophy) · Realism · Evolution and Science Education · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Shifting to structures in physics and biology
On the relationship between scientific theory and ontology in everything flows
Complexity begets crosscutting, dooms hierarchy (another paper on natural kinds)
Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth
Species are, at the same time, kinds and individuals
Goal-dependence in (scientific) ontology
Promiscuous Realism
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,23 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2024 (29) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |