A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism

Bibliographic Data

ID8398282
AuthorsAlex Rosenberg (0000-0001-8341-4660, University of Georgia, corresponding author)
Year1996
Volume47
Issue1
Pages1-29
Publication date1996-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/47.1.1
OpenAlexW1971731891
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited13

This review of recent work in the philosophy of science motivated by a commitment to ‘naturalism’ begins by identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements in the work of Boyd, Giere, Laudan, and Kitcher, I argue that naturalism needs to look for more than mere consistency in its foundations.

Axiom · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Epistemology · Field (mathematics) · Key (lock) · Naturalism · Philosophy of science · Quine · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Science and Climate Studies

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