Modelling Reciprocal Altruism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8398355 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Stephens (0000-0002-9213-1213, University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 533-551 |
| Publication date | 1996-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/47.4.533 |
| OpenAlex | W2132003766 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 19 |
Biologists rely extensively on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game to model reciprocal altruism. After examining the informal conditions necessary for reciprocal altruism, I argue that formal games besides the standard iterated Prisoner's Dilemma meet these conditions. One alternate representation, the modified Prisoner's Dilemma game, removes a standard but unnecessary condition; the other game is what I call a Cook's Dilemma. We should explore these new models of reciprocal altruism because they predict different stability characteristics for various strategies; for instance, I show that strategies such as Tit-for-Tat have different stability dynamics in these alternate models.
Altruism (biology) · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Iterated function · Mathematical economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Reciprocal · Reciprocal altruism · Stability (learning theory) · Superrationality · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.16 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2001 - 2022 (22) |
| Highly cited | No |