Measures, Explanations and the Past

Should ‘Special’ Initial Conditions be Explained

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8398825
AutoresCraig Callender (0000-0002-9192-0018, University of California San Diego, autor correspondente)
Ano2004
Volume55
Fascículo2
Páginas195-217
Data de publicação2004-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/55.2.195
OpenAlexW2047237979
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas29
Referências citadas16

For the generalizations of thermodynamics to obtain, it appears that a very ‘special’ initial condition of the universe is required. Is this initial condition itself in need of explanation? I argue that it is not. In so doing, I offer a framework in which to think about ‘special’ initial conditions in all areas of science, though I concentrate on the case of thermodynamics. I urge the view that it is not always a serious mark against a theory that it must posit an ‘improbable’ initial condition. 1. Introduction2. Price's objection3. What we want explained4. A range of unlikely initial conditions5. Brute facts and explanation6. The best-system analysis7. Explaining the past state8. Conclusion9. Appendix

Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Physics · Range (aeronautics) · Theoretical physics · Advanced Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics · Cosmology and Gravitation Theories · Mathematics · Philosophy · Statistical Mechanics and Entropy