Lewis Causation is a Special Case of Spohn Causation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8398935 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Franz Huber (0000-0003-4298-4282, University of Konstanz, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 207-210 |
| Publication date | 2011-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axq030 |
| OpenAlex | W2153870833 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 5 |
Lewis ([1973a]) famously defined event c to be causally relevant to event e in world w just in case Oc ðÞand Oe ðÞas well as:OðÞ c!:OðÞare e true in w, where Oc ðÞand Oe ðÞsay that c occurs and that e occurs, respectively. For him, this implied that Oc ðÞ! Oe ðÞis true, because he was assuming the underlying logic to be VC, which validates ð ^ Þ ð! Þ. If one works with the weaker system V, the causal relevance of event c to event e has to be defined as follows: (1) both c and e occur in w; i.e. Oc ðÞand Oe ðÞare true in w; (2) if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred either in w; i.e.:OðÞ c!:OðÞis e true in w; (3) if c had occurred, e would have occurred as well in w; i.e. Oc ðÞ! Oe ðÞis true in w; A typical semantics for counterfactual conditionals says that ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’, ! , is true if and only if C is true in all the closest A-worlds (Stalnaker [1968]; Lewis [1973b]). Closeness or distance is spelt out in terms of a relation between possible worlds. In another paper
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| Citations per year | 0.21 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2015 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |