Consciousness and Action
Does Cognitive Science Support (Mild) Epiphenomenalism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399013 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Morgan Wallhagen (Bryn Mawr College, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2007 |
| Volumen | 58 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 539-561 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2007-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axm023 |
| OpenAlex | W2054136544 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 14 |
| Referencias citadas | 6 |
Questions about the function(s) of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious states control most everyday behaviors. Andy Clark ([2001]) does an admirable job of summarizing and defending the most important data thought to support this view. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available does not in fact threaten the view that conscious states play an important and intimate role in the control of much everyday behavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive view about the functions of conscious states in action. 1. Introduction2. Clarifying EBC2.1. Control and guidance2.2. Fine-tuned activity3. The empirical case against EBC4. Conclusion
Action (physics) · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Control (management) · Epistemology · Everyday life · Function (biology) · Sociology · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Is Vision for Action Unconscious
Body schema and body image—Pros and cons
Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely
Are there unconscious perceptual processes
Through the forest of motor representations
A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception
The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience
Are there subintentional actions
Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception
Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery
The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination
What Reaching Teaches
Visual Streams as Core Mechanisms
Phenomenal Concepts, Direct Reference, and the Problem of Double Aspect
| Obras citantes distintas | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,74 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2007 - 2024 (18) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 13 |