Theory, Observation and Scientific Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399078 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jody Azzouni (0000-0002-1626-0670, Tufts University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 371-392 |
| Publication date | 2004-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/55.3.371 |
| OpenAlex | W1990016986 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 5 |
A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored: such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of. Epistemic views in which observation (and generalizations of it) play a central role, and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories, are contrasted in the light of this constraint. It's argued that global-style epistemic virtues can't meet the constraint, although (certain) epistemic views within which observation (and, more generally, thick epistemic access) are centralized do meet it.
Constraint (computer-aided design) · Epistemology · Normative · Philosophy of science · Realism · Style (visual arts) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
A Counterexample to Deflationary Nominalism
Psycho-social disruption, information disorder, and the politics of wind farming
Reassessing the metrics of integration
Once upon a time in superspace
Inference to the source
Detecting extrasolar planets
True Nominalism
Tracking the Real
Reassessing the Explanatory Indispensability Argument
| Citations per year | 0.41 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Highly cited | No |