Users, Structures, and Representation

Bibliographic Data

ID8399199
AuthorsMathias Frisch (0000-0002-1027-3796, University of Maryland, College Park, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume66
Issue2
Pages285-306
Publication date2015-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axt032
OpenAlexW2031052461
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited18

This article defends a pragmatic and structuralist account of scientific representation of the kind recently proposed by Bas van Fraassen against criticisms of both the structuralist and the pragmatist plank of the account. I argue that the account appears to have the unacceptable consequence that the domain of a theory is restricted to phenomena for which we actually have constructed a model—a worry arising from the account’s pragmatism, which is exacerbated by its structuralism. Yet, the account has the resources, at least partially, to address the worry. What remains as implication is a strong anti-foundationalism. 1 Introduction2 ‘No Representation without Representer’3 Representational Structuralism 3.1 Do structural models need to be concretely fitted out? 3.2 The triviality objection4 Anti-foundationalism5 Conclusion

Epistemology · Foundationalism · Nominalism · Ontology · Philosophy of science · Political science · Pragmatism · Representation (politics) · Structuralism (philosophy of science) · Triviality · Worry · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub