Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences

Bibliographic Data

ID8399283
AuthorsJeffrey Dunn (0000-0002-2521-2849, University of Massachusetts Amherst, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume62
Issue1
Pages71-98
Publication date2011-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axq012
OpenAlexW2008906550
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited17

David Lewis ([1986b]) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been subject to a counterexample from Adam Elga ([2000]). In this article, I formulate a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis’s similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the Second Law of Thermodynamics should be seen as a special science law, and give a brief account of what Lewisian special science laws should look like. If successful, this proposal blocks Elga’s counterexample. 1 Introduction 2 The Asymmetry of Miracles and Overdetermination 3 Elga’s Counterexample 4 Possible Solutions 5 Structure of the Special Science Solution 6 The Special Science Solution 6.1 Thermodynamics as a Special Science 6.2 Lewisian Special Science Laws 7 Objections 8 Conclusion

Combinatorics · Context (archaeology) · Counterexample · Counterfactual thinking · Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Metric (unit) · Philosophy of science · Physics · Second law of thermodynamics · Similarity (geometry) · Thermodynamics · Computer Science · Mathematics · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life