The Non-equivalence of Einstein and Lorentz

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8399352
AutoresCandice Bradley (0000-0002-6392-496X, At Bristol, autor correspondente), Clara Bradley (At Bristol, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume72
Fascículo4
Páginas1039-1059
Data de publicação2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axz014
OpenAlexW2897536506
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas12
Referências citadas20

In this article, I give a counterexample to a claim made in (Norton [2008]) that empirically equivalent theories can often be regarded as theoretically equivalent by treating one as having surplus structure, thereby overcoming the problem of underdetermination of theory choice. The case I present is that of Lorentz’s ether theory and Einstein’s theory of special relativity. I argue that Norton’s suggestion that surplus structure is present in Lorentz’s theory in the form of the ether state of rest is based on a misunderstanding of the role that the ether plays in Lorentz’s theory, and that in general, consideration of the conceptual framework in which a theory is embedded is vital to understanding the relationship between different theories.

Classical mechanics · Counterexample · Discrete mathematics · Einstein · Epistemology · Equivalence (formal languages) · Four-force · Lorentz covariance · Lorentz transformation · Philosophy of science · Physics · Pure mathematics · Test theories of special relativity · Theoretical physics · Theory of relativity · Underdetermination · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Relativity and Gravitational Theory