Mathematical Explanation and the Theory of Why-Questions
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399543 |
|---|---|
| Autores | David Sandborg (University of Pittsburgh, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1998 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 603-624 |
| Data de publicação | 1998-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/49.4.603 |
| OpenAlex | W1994310612 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 7 |
| Referências citadas | 13 |
Van Fraassen and others have urged that judgements of explanations are relative to why-questions; explanations should be considered good in so far as they effectively answer why-questions. In this paper, I evaluate van Fraassen's theory with respect to mathematical explanation. I show that his theory cannot recognize any proofs as explanatory. I also present an example that contradicts the main thesis of the why-question approach—an explanation that appears explanatory despite its inability to answer the why-question that motivated it. This example shows how explanatory judgements can be context-dependent without being why-question-relative.
Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Explanatory model · Mathematical proof · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,39 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2008 - 2024 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 7 |