The Non-mechanistic Option

Defending Dynamical Explanations

Bibliographic Data

ID8399749
AuthorsRussell Meyer (0000-0003-3088-2617, University of Wollongong, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume71
Issue3
Pages959-985
Publication date2020-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axy034
OpenAlexW2787356260
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited56

This article demonstrates that non-mechanistic, dynamical explanations are a viable approach to explanation in the special sciences. The claim that dynamical models can be explanatory without reference to mechanisms has previously been met with three lines of criticism from mechanists: the causal relevance concern, the genuine laws concern, and the charge of predictivism. I argue, however, that these mechanist criticisms fail to defeat non-mechanistic, dynamical explanation. Using the examples of Haken et al.’s ([1985]) model of bimanual coordination, and Thelen et al.’s ([2001]) dynamical field model of infant perseverative reaching, I show how each mechanist criticism fails once the standards of Woodward’s ([2003]) interventionist framework are applied to dynamical models. An even-handed application of Woodwardian interventionism reveals that dynamical models are capable of producing genuine explanations without appealing to underlying mechanistic details. 1. Introduction 2. Interventionism and Mechanistic Explanation 2.1. Causal relevance and ideal interventions 2.2. Invariance 2.3. Explanation 3. Covering-Laws and Dynamical Explanation 3.1. Dynamical models 3.2. Covering-law explanation 3.3. Prediction 4. Causal Relevance 4.1. The causal relevance concern 4.2. Intervening on dynamical models 4.3. Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model 4.4. Test case II: Dynamical field model 5. Genuine Laws 5.1. The genuine laws concern 5.2. Using invariance in place of laws 5.3. Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model 5.4. Test case II: Dynamical field model 6. Prediction 6.1. Predictivism 6.2. Crude and invariant prediction 7. Interventionist Criticism of the Haken–Kelso–Bunz Model 8. Dynamical Explanation 8. Conclusion

Criticism · Dynamical systems theory · Epistemology · Field (mathematics) · Mathematical economics · Physics · Political science · Pure mathematics · Quantum mechanics · Relevance (law) · Statistical physics · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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