Causality and Temporal Order in Special Relativity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399790 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hanoch Ben-Yami (0000-0002-4903-854X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 459-479 |
| Publication date | 2006-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axl019 |
| OpenAlex | W1967565064 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 12 |
David Malament tried to show that the causal theory of time leads to a unique determination of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer, namely standard simultaneity. I show that the causal relation Malament uses in his proofs, causal connectibility, should be replaced by a different causal relation, the one used by Reichenbach in his formulation of the theory. I also explain why Malament's reliance on the assumption that the observer has an eternal inertial history modifies our conception of simultaneity, and I therefore eliminate it. Having made these changes, Malament's uniqueness result no longer follows, although the conventionality of simultaneity is not reinstated. I contrast my approach with previous criticisms of Malament. 1. Introduction2. Causality and Temporal Order3. Malament's Argument4. Causality versus Causal Connectibility5. Simultaneity and History6. Conclusion
Causal inference · Causal structure · Causality (physics) · Classical mechanics · Contrast (vision) · Econometrics · Inertial frame of reference · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical economics · Mathematical proof · Observer (physics) · Physics · Relation (database) · Simultaneity · Uniqueness · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Relativity and Gravitational Theory · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
| Citations per year | 0.16 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2007 - 2022 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |