Emotional Conducts

A Phenomenological Account

Bibliographic Data

ID8409393
AuthorsOndřej Švec (0000-0003-2676-9507, Charles University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume54
Issue2
Pages146-168
Publication date2023-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00071773.2023.2171801
OpenAlexW4319971255
LanguageEN
References cited26

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, I contend that emotions should be regarded as emerging from our “vital communication” with the solicitations of our physical and social surroundings. My intention is to present emotions as unitary phenomena arising from an incessant flow of motivations that can be later articulated in terms of reasons (in cognitive theories of emotions) or in terms of causes (in affective neuroscience). I further suggest that emotions should be considered a specific kind of conducts, since the way in which a person acts out her emotions shapes their content, regulates their intensity and transforms the amorphous flow of felt motivations into a recognizable emotional stance for which she is held accountable. In conclusion, I put forward a series of arguments explaining why emotion tends toward its expression in conduct as if towards its completion

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Expression (computer science) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Political science · Unitary state · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology

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