Heidegger, Dreyfus, and the Intelligibility of Practical Comportment

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8409709
AutoresLeslie MacAvoy (0000-0002-0699-7791, East Tennessee State University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen50
Número1
Páginas68-86
Fecha de publicación2019-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00071773.2018.1507419
OpenAlexW2890333943
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas24

Most scholars agree that meaning and intelligibility are central to Heidegger’s account of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, but there is some confusion about the nature of this intelligibility. In his debate with McDowell, Dreyfus draws on phenomenologists like Heidegger to argue that there are two kinds of intelligibility: a basic, nonconceptual, practical intelligibility found in practical comportment and a conceptual, discursive intelligibility. I explore two possible ways that Dreyfus might ground this twofold account of intelligibility in Heidegger: first in the distinction between the hermeneutic and apophantic “as”, and second in the presence and absence of the as-structure. I argue that neither approach succeeds because practical intelligibility is always already discursive and discursive articulation is a condition of practical comportment

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Intelligibility (philosophy) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism