Perceptual Experience in Kant and Merleau-Ponty

Bibliographic Data

ID8409901
AuthorsPeter Antich (0000-0002-2768-8998, Marquette University, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume50
Issue3
Pages220-233
Publication date2019-07-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00071773.2019.1584716
OpenAlexW2915337564
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited25

I argue that the descriptions of perceptual experience offered by Kant and Merleau-Ponty are, contrary to what many commentators suppose, largely compatible. This is because the two are simply referring to different things when they talk about experience: Kant to empirical cognition and Merleau-Ponty to perception. Consequently, while Merleau-Ponty correctly denies that Kant accurately describes the conditions for the possibility of perception, Kant nevertheless provides a plausible account of the conditions of empirical judgment. Further, the two approach experience with different standards of normativity: Kant with the standard of justification, but Merleau-Ponty with the standard of what he calls “motivation”. I exemplify this approach through an analysis of the Second Analogy of Experience

Epistemology · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History

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