Merleau-Ponty on Meaning, Materiality, and Structure
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8410204 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John T Sanders (Rochester Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 96-100 |
| Publication date | 1994-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00071773.1994.11007052 |
| OpenAlex | W2020532495 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 1 |
Against David Schenck's interpretation, I argue that it is not absolutely clear that Merleau-Ponty ever meant to replace what Schenck refers to as the "unity of meanings" interpretation of "structure" with a "material meanings" interpretation. A particular problem-setting -- for example, an attempt to understand the "truth in naturalism" or the "truth in dualism" -- may very well require a particular mode of expression. I argue that the mode of expression chosen by Merleau-Ponty for these purposes, while unfortunate in some of its apparent implications, need not be interpreted as recommitting him to the doctrine he spent his life working to renounce. I have argued that this would have been clearer had he been able to avail himself of James J. Gibson's notion of affordances, which capture perfectly what he was reaching for
Aesthetics · Epistemology · Materiality (auditing) · Meaning (existential) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Psychoanalysis · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1997 - 1997 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |