Can Feelings Exist Differently Through Full Experience? Geiger and Husserl on Feeling and Intentionality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8410909 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yu Lan (0009-0008-4234-4545), Ying Lan (0000-0001-7651-1753, Zhejiang University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 141-166 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00071773.2025.2608987 |
| OpenAlex | W7117458109 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
This paper examines the divergent views of Moritz Geiger and Edmund Husserl on emotional experience and its relationship to intentionality. While both philosophers emphasize affective intentionality, Geiger posits that emotional experience can exist independently of external objects, highlighting the internal, self-sufficient nature of feeling. Husserl, in contrast, defends the idea that feelings remain directed towards something, even when this relation is not immediately apparent. Through a detailed comparison of their theories, I argue that Geiger’s conception of emotional experience as an autonomous phenomenon provides a more nuanced understanding of the role of reflection and understanding in feelings. Finally, I contend that, despite Husserl’s critiques, Geiger’s realist perspective on emotions enriches our understanding of phenomenological intentionality
Feeling · Geiger counter · Intentionality · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Humanities and Social Sciences · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |