Ideas of Habit and Custom in Early Modern Philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID8410954
AuthorsJohn Wright (0000-0001-9572-7293, Central Michigan University, corresponding author), John P Wright
Year2011
Volume42
Issue1
Pages18-32
Publication date2011-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00071773.2011.11006729
OpenAlexW2011008550
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited1

There were no single full-length thematic studies of habit during the Early Modern period, though it was discussed in relation to many other topics. Nevertheless, puzzles about habit were posed by many thinkers of this period which were later taken up in the systematic studies of thinkers such as Maine de Biran1 and Félix Ravaisson2 in the nineteenth century. David Hume wrote of the ‘extraordinary ’ effects of custom or habit — words which Early Modern philosophers used interchangeably.3 Joseph Butler noted that ‘contrary effects’ are ‘ascribed to it’, and that habit is difficult to distinguish from other mental powers.4 Both recognized that through habit some mental phenomena grow stronger, while others grow weaker. Locke argued that through habit an action which is initially painful can become pleasurable; but Hume added that many actions which are pleasurable can become indifferent or even painful through too much exercise. Some philosophers of this period argued that habit destroys voluntary action; but others, going back to Aristotle, argued that actions become voluntary through constant exercise. Some argued that habit could be explained

Epistemology · Habit · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Psychology · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Social Psychology

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