Lévinas on Shared Ethical Judgments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8411103 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Crowe (0000-0002-2057-5771, The University of Queensland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 233-242 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00071773.2011.11006745 |
| OpenAlex | W2079141121 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 4 |
Emmanuel Levinas’s emphasis on the face to face encounter as the site of ethical engagement makes a genuinely shared conception of ethics seem both unnecessary and impossible. Discussions of this aspect of Levinas’s theory have tended to focus on his notion of the third [le tiers]. However, while the third explains why shared ethical judgments are necessary, it does not explain how they are possible. This article offers an alternative response, based on Levinas’s comments on the temporality of ethical experience. In order to see how shared ethical judgments are possible, we need to pay attention to the diachronic, as well as the synchronic, dimension of the face to face. This allows us to deepen the account of ethical discourse associated with the third
Dimension (graph theory) · Epistemology · Ethical theory · Face (sociological concept) · Focus (optics) · Order (exchange) · Social science · Sociology · Temporality · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology · Social Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 0.36 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2022 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |