The atomic bomb and the citizens of Nagasaki
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8414783 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sadao Kamata (corresponding author), Stephen Salaff |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 38-50 |
| Publication date | 1982-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-4810 • E-ISSN: 1472-6033 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/14672715.1982.10412647 |
| OpenAlex | W2323982859 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 4 |
clearly prospective, challenges the North American contention" that atomic bombs were patriotically dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 as legitimate weapons of war to compel a prompt Japanese surrender and to forestall large numbers of allied casualties. Collateral decisions of the General Assembly lend further political and moral weight to the ongoing campaign for the enactment of a "Bill for the Relief of Abombed Survivors," based on the principles of national indemnity, which is promoted by the six opposition parties in the Japanese Diet. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked with A-bombs even though the United States government knew that by early 1945 Japan had broken down economically and strategically, and that "a large element of the Japanese Cabinet was ready in the spring [of 1945] to accept substantially the same [surrender] terms as those finally agreed on." 3 Soon after Japan's decisive military reverses at Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the Mariana island chain in July 1944, a surrender movement developed in Tokyo, which feared not defeat but domestic revolution and the demise of the imperial polity. Prince Konoe, three times premier of Japan and Emperor Hirohito's favorite senior statesman, who spoke for many of the top business and government leaders, reluctantly acknowledged in his February 1945 "Memorial to the Throne" that Japan had "already lost the war," recommended its termination "as speedily as possible," and warned that if hostilities were prolonged "a Communist revolution" reinforced by "Soviet intervention" would overthrow the imperial institution. 4 The position of the war party was undermined by the fall of Okinawa in June 1945, after which the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (the "inner cabinet" of the six chief military and government leaders) admitted defeat. On 12 July, Tokyo's ambassador to the Kremlin was instructed to enlist the Soviet Union, not yet a military combatant in the Pacific War, as a mediator between the Anglo-U.S. and Japanese goverments. The Supreme Council cabled him that "unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace. ''5 Japan's aversion to unconditional surrender was well known at the time, since U.S. intelligence, whose cryptographers earlier had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes, intercepted the 12 July cable and relayed its contents to Washington
Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Meaning (existential · Nightmare · Nuclear warfare · Nuclear weapon · Political science · Sociology · The Holocaust · History · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Philosophy · Psychology · Risk Perception and Management
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2026 (25) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |