What drove the financial crisis? Structuring our historical understanding of a predictable evolutionary disaster

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8418756
AutoresMichael G Jacobides (0000-0002-0615-6191, London Business School, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen57
Número5
Páginas716-735
Fecha de publicación2015-07-04
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaBusiness History (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-6791 • E-ISSN: 1743-7938
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00076791.2014.975120
OpenAlexW1498001496
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas35

This article revisits the 2008 financial crisis, considering how we can draw on the historical record to reappraise what created the problems and inform theory. It looks in detail at neglected factors such as the nature of the selection environment, the agency of actors, and the influence of structure. On the basis of that evidence, as well as the premise that feedback, rather than foresight, drives behavior, we reach new conclusions on what drove the crisis, and open up an exciting opportunity for historical methods to inform theory. This challenges current policy in terms of the idea of ‘Too Big To Fail’ and the focus of regulation; it also helps us revisit the lessons that we should take from this crisis, taking us away from macro-economic factors and individual malfeasance towards structure. Overall, the analysis suggests that a historical, institutional, and evolutionary analysis, based in theory, can add a fresh perspective

Agency (philosophy · Economics · Epistemology · Financial crisis · Futures studies · Macro · Macroeconomics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Positive economics · Premise · Social science · Sociology · Structure and agency · Structuring · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic Theory and Institutions · Finance