British corporate networks, 1976–2010
Extending the study of finance–industry relationships
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8420702 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Emily Buchnea (0000-0003-0788-5887, Faculty of Business & Law, Northumbria University Newcastle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK), Anna Tilba (0000-0002-3988-1111, Durham University Business School, Durham, UK), John F Wilson (0000-0001-7728-2892, Faculty of Business & Law, Northumbria University Newcastle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Fascículo | 6 |
| Páginas | 1027-1057 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-08-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Business History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0007-6791 • E-ISSN: 1743-7938 |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00076791.2018.1512096 |
| OpenAlex | W2886997002 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 6 |
| Referências citadas | 60 |
Using an extensive and unique data set that has been created to record the composition of the boards of directors of the top 250 British firms between 1904 and 2010, this article builds upon a previous study by the authors on the corporate network to 1976 by extending the study to 2010. The analysis revolves around three key observations: the nature and depth of the corporate network; the distinct stages in corporate connectivity between 1976 and 2010; and the 1980s watershed in the relationship between financial and other sectors, following which financial institutions withdrew from the corporate network. The article concludes with an analysis of how the data set has changed our perceptions of British corporate networks, wider changes in British business, and a discussion of implications for future research
Business · Corporate Finance · Corporate governance · Economics · Accounting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Corporate Finance and Governance · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Finance
The Renewal of the Corporate Elite in Spain (1920–2020)
Above board? Interlocking directorates and corporate contagion in 1980s Australia
Corporate Networks and Business Groups in Egypt, 1924–1948
Modern Chinese banking networks during the Republican Era
The policy-planning capacity of the American corporate community
Financiarización de la elite empresarial? Un análisis a partir de la composición, propiedad y directorios de la cúpula empresarial argentina
Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes
Financialization and Strategy
Small Worlds Among Interlocking Directors
Administrative science quarterly cumulative index, volumes 1-30 (1956-1985)
The Power of Corporate Networks
Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification
Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes
Owners or traders? Conceptualizations of institutional investors and their relationship with corporate managers
Active Controllers or Wealthy Rentiers? Large Shareholders in Victorian Public Companies
Regulatory Responses to the Rise of the Market for Corporate Control in Britain in the 1950s
Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance Systems
Centrality and investment strategies at the beginning of industrialisation in mid-nineteenth-century Catalonia
Merchant Banking in the Inter-War Period
Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950
Creating better boards through codification
Complexity in history
Interlocked’ business groups and the state in Chile (1970–2010)
Co-operative Capitalism
Corporate Control and Corporate Rule
The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany
London's Big Bang in international context
The Rise of the Corporate Economy
Commonalities and Connections among Directors of Large Financial Institutions
What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates
Coordination and Control in Corporate Networks
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 6 |