Locke and Rorty on Cultural Pluralism

This article aims to investigate Alain Locke and Richard Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism. First, I argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and Locke’s critique of absolutes are similar with respect to the nature of value. I then explain their respective conceptions of culture and cultural pluralism. Finally, I argue that their fundamental differences with each other in regards to culture and cultural pluralism lie in their differing theories of value. Whereas Rorty’s nominalist understanding of value only finds the relativity and contingency of culture and value, Locke’s functionalist theory of value allows for the objectivity and universality of culture and value. To make these differences explicit, I introduce a distinction between value content and value process. If my reading of Locke and Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism is convincing, then we can find a more robust view of tolerance in Locke’s version of cultural pluralism than in Rorty’s

Contingency · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Nominalism · Pluralism (philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Universalism · Universality (dynamical systems · Value (mathematics · Value pluralism · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications