Denial Has Its Consequences
Peirce's Bilateral Semantics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8903126 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Beisecker Beisecker (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 361-361 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0009-1774 • E-ISSN: 1558-9587 |
| Publisher | Indiana University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.55.4.01 |
| OpenAlex | W3012138989 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 6 |
In a few of his 1904–6 pragmaticist formulations of the pragmatic maxim, Peirce instructs us to look not only at the consequences of affirming some claim or concept, but also at the consequences of denying it. While Peirce isn't forthcoming about why he includes the consequences of denying claims, I argue that this inclusion is important, indeed prescient, and also under-appreciated. Specifically, after aligning these later formulations of the pragmatic maxim with bilateral tableau systems of logical proof, I show how they serve to defuse an objection that Brandom has raised against the semantic project of the classical pragmatists, namely, that it subscribes to an insufficiently one-sided view of meaning. I close by showing how Peirce's bilateral expressions of the pragmatic maxim also align with his existential graphs, suggesting that these expressions could well have been key to his attempt to provide a formal demonstration of pragmatism's correctness
Denial · Epistemology · Existentialism · Linguistics · Maxim · Meaning (existential · Pragmatism · Psychoanalysis · Semantics (computer science · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |